mirror of
https://github.com/owasp-modsecurity/ModSecurity.git
synced 2025-09-29 19:24:29 +03:00
iis: New improvements on the Wix installer
- Now the installation is divided in modules: ModSecurity and CRS. - Added default configuration - Configuration was moved to "Program Files" folder - Build_msi script now using candle available in %PATH%
This commit is contained in:
committed by
Felipe Zimmerle
parent
1a12648c9f
commit
2ea5a74a7b
@@ -1,19 +1,20 @@
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set WIX=C:\Program Files (x86)\WiX Toolset v3.7\bin
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set PATH="%PATH%;C:\Program Files (x86)\WiX Toolset v3.8\bin;C:\Program Files (x86)\WiX Toolset v3.7\bin;"
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set CURRENT_DIR=%cd%
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set CURRENT_DIR=%cd%
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del installer.wix*
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del installer.wix*
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"%WIX%\candle.exe" -ext WixUtilExtension -ext WixUIExtension "%CURRENT_DIR%\installer.wxs" -out "%CURRENT_DIR%\installer.wixobj" -dPlatform="x64"
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"candle.exe" -ext WixUtilExtension -ext WixUIExtension "%CURRENT_DIR%\installer.wxs" -out "%CURRENT_DIR%\installer.wixobj" -dPlatform="x64"
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@if NOT (%ERRORLEVEL%) == (0) goto build_failed
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@if NOT (%ERRORLEVEL%) == (0) goto build_failed
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"%WIX%\light.exe" -ext WixUtilExtension -ext WixUIExtension "%CURRENT_DIR%\installer.wixobj" -out "%CURRENT_DIR%\installer-64.msi" -dPlatform="x64"
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"light.exe" -ext WixUtilExtension -ext WixUIExtension "%CURRENT_DIR%\installer.wixobj" -out "%CURRENT_DIR%\installer-64.msi" -dPlatform="x64"
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@if NOT (%ERRORLEVEL%) == (0) goto build_failed
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@if NOT (%ERRORLEVEL%) == (0) goto build_failed
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"%WIX%\candle.exe" -ext WixUtilExtension -ext WixUIExtension "%CURRENT_DIR%\installer.wxs" -out "%CURRENT_DIR%\installer.wixobj" -dPlatform="x86"
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"candle.exe" -ext WixUtilExtension -ext WixUIExtension "%CURRENT_DIR%\installer.wxs" -out "%CURRENT_DIR%\installer.wixobj" -dPlatform="x86"
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@if NOT (%ERRORLEVEL%) == (0) goto build_failed
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@if NOT (%ERRORLEVEL%) == (0) goto build_failed
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"%WIX%\light.exe" -ext WixUtilExtension -ext WixUIExtension "%CURRENT_DIR%\installer.wixobj" -out "%CURRENT_DIR%\installer-32.msi" -dPlatform="x86"
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"light.exe" -ext WixUtilExtension -ext WixUIExtension "%CURRENT_DIR%\installer.wixobj" -out "%CURRENT_DIR%\installer-32.msi" -dPlatform="x86"
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@if NOT (%ERRORLEVEL%) == (0) goto build_failed
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@if NOT (%ERRORLEVEL%) == (0) goto build_failed
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exit /B 0
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exit /B 0
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1627
iis/installer.wxs
1627
iis/installer.wxs
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
214
iis/wix/modsecurity.conf
Normal file
214
iis/wix/modsecurity.conf
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
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# based on modsecurity.conf-recommended
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# -- Rule engine initialization ----------------------------------------------
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# Enable ModSecurity, attaching it to every transaction. Use detection
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# only to start with, because that minimises the chances of post-installation
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# disruption.
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#
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SecRuleEngine DetectionOnly
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# -- Request body handling ---------------------------------------------------
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# Allow ModSecurity to access request bodies. If you don't, ModSecurity
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# won't be able to see any POST parameters, which opens a large security
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# hole for attackers to exploit.
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#
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SecRequestBodyAccess On
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# Enable XML request body parser.
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# Initiate XML Processor in case of xml content-type
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#
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SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type "text/xml" \
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"id:'200000',phase:1,t:none,t:lowercase,pass,nolog,ctl:requestBodyProcessor=XML"
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# Maximum request body size we will accept for buffering. If you support
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# file uploads then the value given on the first line has to be as large
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# as the largest file you are willing to accept. The second value refers
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# to the size of data, with files excluded. You want to keep that value as
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# low as practical.
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#
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SecRequestBodyLimit 13107200
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SecRequestBodyNoFilesLimit 131072
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# Store up to 128 KB of request body data in memory. When the multipart
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# parser reachers this limit, it will start using your hard disk for
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# storage. That is slow, but unavoidable.
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#
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SecRequestBodyInMemoryLimit 131072
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# What do do if the request body size is above our configured limit.
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# Keep in mind that this setting will automatically be set to ProcessPartial
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# when SecRuleEngine is set to DetectionOnly mode in order to minimize
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# disruptions when initially deploying ModSecurity.
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#
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SecRequestBodyLimitAction Reject
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# Verify that we've correctly processed the request body.
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# As a rule of thumb, when failing to process a request body
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# you should reject the request (when deployed in blocking mode)
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# or log a high-severity alert (when deployed in detection-only mode).
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#
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SecRule REQBODY_ERROR "!@eq 0" \
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"id:'200001', phase:2,t:none,log,deny,status:400,msg:'Failed to parse request body.',logdata:'%{reqbody_error_msg}',severity:2"
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# By default be strict with what we accept in the multipart/form-data
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# request body. If the rule below proves to be too strict for your
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# environment consider changing it to detection-only. You are encouraged
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# _not_ to remove it altogether.
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#
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SecRule MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR "!@eq 0" \
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"id:'200002',phase:2,t:none,log,deny,status:44, \
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msg:'Multipart request body failed strict validation: \
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PE %{REQBODY_PROCESSOR_ERROR}, \
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BQ %{MULTIPART_BOUNDARY_QUOTED}, \
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BW %{MULTIPART_BOUNDARY_WHITESPACE}, \
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DB %{MULTIPART_DATA_BEFORE}, \
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DA %{MULTIPART_DATA_AFTER}, \
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HF %{MULTIPART_HEADER_FOLDING}, \
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LF %{MULTIPART_LF_LINE}, \
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SM %{MULTIPART_MISSING_SEMICOLON}, \
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IQ %{MULTIPART_INVALID_QUOTING}, \
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IP %{MULTIPART_INVALID_PART}, \
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IH %{MULTIPART_INVALID_HEADER_FOLDING}, \
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FL %{MULTIPART_FILE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED}'"
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# Did we see anything that might be a boundary?
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#
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SecRule MULTIPART_UNMATCHED_BOUNDARY "!@eq 0" \
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"id:'200003',phase:2,t:none,log,deny,status:44,msg:'Multipart parser detected a possible unmatched boundary.'"
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# PCRE Tuning
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# We want to avoid a potential RegEx DoS condition
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#
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SecPcreMatchLimit 1000
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SecPcreMatchLimitRecursion 1000
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# Some internal errors will set flags in TX and we will need to look for these.
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# All of these are prefixed with "MSC_". The following flags currently exist:
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#
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# MSC_PCRE_LIMITS_EXCEEDED: PCRE match limits were exceeded.
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#
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SecRule TX:/^MSC_/ "!@streq 0" \
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"id:'200004',phase:2,t:none,deny,msg:'ModSecurity internal error flagged: %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}'"
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# -- Response body handling --------------------------------------------------
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# Allow ModSecurity to access response bodies.
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# You should have this directive enabled in order to identify errors
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# and data leakage issues.
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#
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# Do keep in mind that enabling this directive does increases both
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# memory consumption and response latency.
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#
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#SecResponseBodyAccess On
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# Which response MIME types do you want to inspect? You should adjust the
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# configuration below to catch documents but avoid static files
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# (e.g., images and archives).
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#
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SecResponseBodyMimeType text/plain text/html text/xml
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# Buffer response bodies of up to 512 KB in length.
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SecResponseBodyLimit 524288
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# What happens when we encounter a response body larger than the configured
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# limit? By default, we process what we have and let the rest through.
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# That's somewhat less secure, but does not break any legitimate pages.
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#
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SecResponseBodyLimitAction ProcessPartial
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# -- Filesystem configuration ------------------------------------------------
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# The location where ModSecurity stores temporary files (for example, when
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# it needs to handle a file upload that is larger than the configured limit).
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#
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# This default setting is chosen due to all systems have /tmp available however,
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# this is less than ideal. It is recommended that you specify a location that's private.
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#
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SecTmpDir c:\inetpub\temp\
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# The location where ModSecurity will keep its persistent data. This default setting
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# is chosen due to all systems have /tmp available however, it
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# too should be updated to a place that other users can't access.
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#
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SecDataDir c:\inetpub\temp\
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# -- File uploads handling configuration -------------------------------------
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# The location where ModSecurity stores intercepted uploaded files. This
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# location must be private to ModSecurity. You don't want other users on
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# the server to access the files, do you?
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#
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#SecUploadDir /opt/modsecurity/var/upload/
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# By default, only keep the files that were determined to be unusual
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# in some way (by an external inspection script). For this to work you
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# will also need at least one file inspection rule.
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#
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#SecUploadKeepFiles RelevantOnly
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# Uploaded files are by default created with permissions that do not allow
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# any other user to access them. You may need to relax that if you want to
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# interface ModSecurity to an external program (e.g., an anti-virus).
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#
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#SecUploadFileMode 0600
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# -- Debug log configuration -------------------------------------------------
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# The default debug log configuration is to duplicate the error, warning
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# and notice messages from the error log.
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#
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#SecDebugLog /opt/modsecurity/var/log/debug.log
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#SecDebugLogLevel 3
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# -- Audit log configuration -------------------------------------------------
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# Log the transactions that are marked by a rule, as well as those that
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# trigger a server error (determined by a 5xx or 4xx, excluding 404,
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# level response status codes).
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#
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#SecAuditEngine RelevantOnly
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#SecAuditLogRelevantStatus "^(?:5|4(?!04))"
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# Log everything we know about a transaction.
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#SecAuditLogParts ABIJDEFHZ
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# Use a single file for logging. This is much easier to look at, but
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# assumes that you will use the audit log only ocassionally.
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#
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#SecAuditLogType Serial
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#SecAuditLog c:\inetpub\log\modsec_audit.log
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# Specify the path for concurrent audit logging.
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#SecAuditLogStorageDir c:\inetpub\log\
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# -- Miscellaneous -----------------------------------------------------------
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# Use the most commonly used application/x-www-form-urlencoded parameter
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# separator. There's probably only one application somewhere that uses
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# something else so don't expect to change this value.
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#
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SecArgumentSeparator &
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# Settle on version 0 (zero) cookies, as that is what most applications
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# use. Using an incorrect cookie version may open your installation to
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# evasion attacks (against the rules that examine named cookies).
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#
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SecCookieFormat 0
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# Specify your Unicode Code Point.
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# This mapping is used by the t:urlDecodeUni transformation function
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# to properly map encoded data to your language. Properly setting
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# these directives helps to reduce false positives and negatives.
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#
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#SecUnicodeCodePage 20127
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#SecUnicodeMapFile unicode.mapping
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428
iis/wix/modsecurity_crs_10_setup.conf
Normal file
428
iis/wix/modsecurity_crs_10_setup.conf
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,428 @@
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------
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# Core ModSecurity Rule Set ver.2.2.6
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# Copyright (C) 2006-2012 Trustwave All rights reserved.
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#
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# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
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# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
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# Please see the enclosed LICENCE file for full details.
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------
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#
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# -- [[ Recommended Base Configuration ]] -------------------------------------------------
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#
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# The configuration directives/settings in this file are used to control
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# the OWASP ModSecurity CRS. These settings do **NOT** configure the main
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# ModSecurity settings such as:
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#
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# - SecRuleEngine
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# - SecRequestBodyAccess
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# - SecAuditEngine
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# - SecDebugLog
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#
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# You should use the modsecurity.conf-recommended file that comes with the
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# ModSecurity source code archive.
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#
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# Ref: http://mod-security.svn.sourceforge.net/viewvc/mod-security/m2/trunk/modsecurity.conf-recommended
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#
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#
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# -- [[ Rule Version ]] -------------------------------------------------------------------
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#
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# Rule version data is added to the "Producer" line of Section H of the Audit log:
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#
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# - Producer: ModSecurity for Apache/2.7.0-rc1 (http://www.modsecurity.org/); OWASP_CRS/2.2.4.
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#
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# Ref: https://sourceforge.net/apps/mediawiki/mod-security/index.php?title=Reference_Manual#SecComponentSignature
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#
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SecComponentSignature "OWASP_CRS/2.2.6"
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#
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# -- [[ Modes of Operation: Self-Contained vs. Collaborative Detection ]] -----------------
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#
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# Each detection rule uses the "block" action which will inherit the SecDefaultAction
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# specified below. Your settings here will determine which mode of operation you use.
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#
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# -- [[ Self-Contained Mode ]] --
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# Rules inherit the "deny" disruptive action. The first rule that matches will block.
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#
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# -- [[ Collaborative Detection Mode ]] --
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# This is a "delayed blocking" mode of operation where each matching rule will inherit
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# the "pass" action and will only contribute to anomaly scores. Transactional blocking
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# can be applied
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#
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# -- [[ Alert Logging Control ]] --
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# You have three options -
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#
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# - To log to both the Apache error_log and ModSecurity audit_log file use: "log"
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# - To log *only* to the ModSecurity audit_log file use: "nolog,auditlog"
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# - To log *only* to the Apache error_log file use: "log,noauditlog"
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#
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# Ref: http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2010/11/advanced-topic-of-the-week-traditional-vs-anomaly-scoring-detection-modes.html
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# Ref: https://sourceforge.net/apps/mediawiki/mod-security/index.php?title=Reference_Manual#SecDefaultAction
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#
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SecDefaultAction "phase:1,deny,log"
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#
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# -- [[ Collaborative Detection Severity Levels ]] ----------------------------------------
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#
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# These are the default scoring points for each severity level. You may
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# adjust these to you liking. These settings will be used in macro expansion
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# in the rules to increment the anomaly scores when rules match.
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#
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# These are the default Severity ratings (with anomaly scores) of the individual rules -
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#
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# - 2: Critical - Anomaly Score of 5.
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# Is the highest severity level possible without correlation. It is
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# normally generated by the web attack rules (40 level files).
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# - 3: Error - Anomaly Score of 4.
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# Is generated mostly from outbound leakage rules (50 level files).
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# - 4: Warning - Anomaly Score of 3.
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# Is generated by malicious client rules (35 level files).
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# - 5: Notice - Anomaly Score of 2.
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# Is generated by the Protocol policy and anomaly files.
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#
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SecAction \
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"id:'900001', \
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phase:1, \
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t:none, \
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setvar:tx.critical_anomaly_score=5, \
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setvar:tx.error_anomaly_score=4, \
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setvar:tx.warning_anomaly_score=3, \
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setvar:tx.notice_anomaly_score=2, \
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nolog, \
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pass"
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||||||
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||||||
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|
||||||
|
#
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||||||
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# -- [[ Collaborative Detection Scoring Threshold Levels ]] ------------------------------
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||||||
|
#
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||||||
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# These variables are used in macro expansion in the 49 inbound blocking and 59
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||||||
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# outbound blocking files.
|
||||||
|
#
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||||||
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# **MUST HAVE** ModSecurity v2.5.12 or higher to use macro expansion in numeric
|
||||||
|
# operators. If you have an earlier version, edit the 49/59 files directly to
|
||||||
|
# set the appropriate anomaly score levels.
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# You should set the score to the proper threshold you would prefer. If set to "5"
|
||||||
|
# it will work similarly to previous Mod CRS rules and will create an event in the error_log
|
||||||
|
# file if there are any rules that match. If you would like to lessen the number of events
|
||||||
|
# generated in the error_log file, you should increase the anomaly score threshold to
|
||||||
|
# something like "20". This would only generate an event in the error_log file if
|
||||||
|
# there are multiple lower severity rule matches or if any 1 higher severity item matches.
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
SecAction \
|
||||||
|
"id:'900002', \
|
||||||
|
phase:1, \
|
||||||
|
t:none, \
|
||||||
|
setvar:tx.inbound_anomaly_score_level=5, \
|
||||||
|
nolog, \
|
||||||
|
pass"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SecAction \
|
||||||
|
"id:'900003', \
|
||||||
|
phase:1, \
|
||||||
|
t:none, \
|
||||||
|
setvar:tx.outbound_anomaly_score_level=4, \
|
||||||
|
nolog, \
|
||||||
|
pass"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# -- [[ Collaborative Detection Blocking ]] -----------------------------------------------
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# This is a collaborative detection mode where each rule will increment an overall
|
||||||
|
# anomaly score for the transaction. The scores are then evaluated in the following files:
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# Inbound anomaly score - checked in the modsecurity_crs_49_inbound_blocking.conf file
|
||||||
|
# Outbound anomaly score - checked in the modsecurity_crs_59_outbound_blocking.conf file
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# If you want to use anomaly scoring mode, then uncomment this line.
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
#SecAction \
|
||||||
|
"id:'900004', \
|
||||||
|
phase:1, \
|
||||||
|
t:none, \
|
||||||
|
setvar:tx.anomaly_score_blocking=on, \
|
||||||
|
nolog, \
|
||||||
|
pass"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# -- [[ GeoIP Database ]] -----------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# There are some rulesets that need to inspect the GEO data of the REMOTE_ADDR data.
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# You must first download the MaxMind GeoIP Lite City DB -
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# http://geolite.maxmind.com/download/geoip/database/GeoLiteCity.dat.gz
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# You then need to define the proper path for the SecGeoLookupDb directive
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# Ref: http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2010/10/detecting-malice-with-modsecurity-geolocation-data.html
|
||||||
|
# Ref: http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2010/11/detecting-malice-with-modsecurity-ip-forensics.html
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
#SecGeoLookupDb /opt/modsecurity/lib/GeoLiteCity.dat
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# -- [[ Regression Testing Mode ]] --------------------------------------------------------
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# If you are going to run the regression testing mode, you should uncomment the
|
||||||
|
# following rule. It will enable DetectionOnly mode for the SecRuleEngine and
|
||||||
|
# will enable Response Header tagging so that the client testing script can see
|
||||||
|
# which rule IDs have matched.
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# You must specify the your source IP address where you will be running the tests
|
||||||
|
# from.
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
#SecRule REMOTE_ADDR "@ipMatch 192.168.1.100" \
|
||||||
|
"id:'900005', \
|
||||||
|
phase:1, \
|
||||||
|
t:none, \
|
||||||
|
ctl:ruleEngine=DetectionOnly, \
|
||||||
|
setvar:tx.regression_testing=1, \
|
||||||
|
nolog, \
|
||||||
|
pass"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# -- [[ HTTP Policy Settings ]] ----------------------------------------------------------
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# Set the following policy settings here and they will be propagated to the 23 rules
|
||||||
|
# file (modsecurity_common_23_request_limits.conf) by using macro expansion.
|
||||||
|
# If you run into false positives, you can adjust the settings here.
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# Only the max number of args is uncommented by default as there are a high rate
|
||||||
|
# of false positives. Uncomment the items you wish to set.
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# -- Maximum number of arguments in request limited
|
||||||
|
SecAction \
|
||||||
|
"id:'900006', \
|
||||||
|
phase:1, \
|
||||||
|
t:none, \
|
||||||
|
setvar:tx.max_num_args=255, \
|
||||||
|
nolog, \
|
||||||
|
pass"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# -- Limit argument name length
|
||||||
|
#SecAction \
|
||||||
|
"id:'900007', \
|
||||||
|
phase:1, \
|
||||||
|
t:none, \
|
||||||
|
setvar:tx.arg_name_length=100, \
|
||||||
|
nolog, \
|
||||||
|
pass"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# -- Limit value name length
|
||||||
|
#SecAction \
|
||||||
|
"id:'900008', \
|
||||||
|
phase:1, \
|
||||||
|
t:none, \
|
||||||
|
setvar:tx.arg_length=400, \
|
||||||
|
nolog, \
|
||||||
|
pass"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# -- Limit arguments total length
|
||||||
|
#SecAction \
|
||||||
|
"id:'900009', \
|
||||||
|
phase:1, \
|
||||||
|
t:none, \
|
||||||
|
setvar:tx.total_arg_length=64000, \
|
||||||
|
nolog, \
|
||||||
|
pass"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# -- Individual file size is limited
|
||||||
|
#SecAction \
|
||||||
|
"id:'900010', \
|
||||||
|
phase:1, \
|
||||||
|
t:none, \
|
||||||
|
setvar:tx.max_file_size=1048576, \
|
||||||
|
nolog, \
|
||||||
|
pass"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# -- Combined file size is limited
|
||||||
|
#SecAction \
|
||||||
|
"id:'900011', \
|
||||||
|
phase:1, \
|
||||||
|
t:none, \
|
||||||
|
setvar:tx.combined_file_sizes=1048576, \
|
||||||
|
nolog, \
|
||||||
|
pass"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# Set the following policy settings here and they will be propagated to the 30 rules
|
||||||
|
# file (modsecurity_crs_30_http_policy.conf) by using macro expansion.
|
||||||
|
# If you run into false positves, you can adjust the settings here.
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
SecAction \
|
||||||
|
"id:'900012', \
|
||||||
|
phase:1, \
|
||||||
|
t:none, \
|
||||||
|
setvar:'tx.allowed_methods=GET HEAD POST OPTIONS', \
|
||||||
|
setvar:'tx.allowed_request_content_type=application/x-www-form-urlencoded|multipart/form-data|text/xml|application/xml|application/x-amf|application/json', \
|
||||||
|
setvar:'tx.allowed_http_versions=HTTP/0.9 HTTP/1.0 HTTP/1.1', \
|
||||||
|
setvar:'tx.restricted_extensions=.asa/ .asax/ .ascx/ .axd/ .backup/ .bak/ .bat/ .cdx/ .cer/ .cfg/ .cmd/ .com/ .config/ .conf/ .cs/ .csproj/ .csr/ .dat/ .db/ .dbf/ .dll/ .dos/ .htr/ .htw/ .ida/ .idc/ .idq/ .inc/ .ini/ .key/ .licx/ .lnk/ .log/ .mdb/ .old/ .pass/ .pdb/ .pol/ .printer/ .pwd/ .resources/ .resx/ .sql/ .sys/ .vb/ .vbs/ .vbproj/ .vsdisco/ .webinfo/ .xsd/ .xsx/', \
|
||||||
|
setvar:'tx.restricted_headers=/Proxy-Connection/ /Lock-Token/ /Content-Range/ /Translate/ /via/ /if/', \
|
||||||
|
nolog, \
|
||||||
|
pass"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# -- [[ Content Security Policy (CSP) Settings ]] -----------------------------------------
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# The purpose of these settings is to send CSP response headers to
|
||||||
|
# Mozilla FireFox users so that you can enforce how dynamic content
|
||||||
|
# is used. CSP usage helps to prevent XSS attacks against your users.
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# Reference Link:
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# https://developer.mozilla.org/en/Security/CSP
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# Uncomment this SecAction line if you want use CSP enforcement.
|
||||||
|
# You need to set the appropriate directives and settings for your site/domain and
|
||||||
|
# and activate the CSP file in the experimental_rules directory.
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# Ref: http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2011/04/modsecurity-advanced-topic-of-the-week-integrating-content-security-policy-csp.html
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
#SecAction \
|
||||||
|
"id:'900013', \
|
||||||
|
phase:1, \
|
||||||
|
t:none, \
|
||||||
|
setvar:tx.csp_report_only=1, \
|
||||||
|
setvar:tx.csp_report_uri=/csp_violation_report, \
|
||||||
|
setenv:'csp_policy=allow \'self\'; img-src *.yoursite.com; media-src *.yoursite.com; style-src *.yoursite.com; frame-ancestors *.yoursite.com; script-src *.yoursite.com; report-uri %{tx.csp_report_uri}', \
|
||||||
|
nolog, \
|
||||||
|
pass"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# -- [[ Brute Force Protection ]] ---------------------------------------------------------
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# If you are using the Brute Force Protection rule set, then uncomment the following
|
||||||
|
# lines and set the following variables:
|
||||||
|
# - Protected URLs: resources to protect (e.g. login pages) - set to your login page
|
||||||
|
# - Burst Time Slice Interval: time interval window to monitor for bursts
|
||||||
|
# - Request Threshold: request # threshold to trigger a burst
|
||||||
|
# - Block Period: temporary block timeout
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
#SecAction \
|
||||||
|
"id:'900014', \
|
||||||
|
phase:1, \
|
||||||
|
t:none, \
|
||||||
|
setvar:'tx.brute_force_protected_urls=/login.jsp /partner_login.php', \
|
||||||
|
setvar:'tx.brute_force_burst_time_slice=60', \
|
||||||
|
setvar:'tx.brute_force_counter_threshold=10', \
|
||||||
|
setvar:'tx.brute_force_block_timeout=300', \
|
||||||
|
nolog, \
|
||||||
|
pass"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# -- [[ DoS Protection ]] ----------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# If you are using the DoS Protection rule set, then uncomment the following
|
||||||
|
# lines and set the following variables:
|
||||||
|
# - Burst Time Slice Interval: time interval window to monitor for bursts
|
||||||
|
# - Request Threshold: request # threshold to trigger a burst
|
||||||
|
# - Block Period: temporary block timeout
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
#SecAction \
|
||||||
|
"id:'900015', \
|
||||||
|
phase:1, \
|
||||||
|
t:none, \
|
||||||
|
setvar:'tx.dos_burst_time_slice=60', \
|
||||||
|
setvar:'tx.dos_counter_threshold=100', \
|
||||||
|
setvar:'tx.dos_block_timeout=600', \
|
||||||
|
nolog, \
|
||||||
|
pass"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# -- [[ Check UTF enconding ]] -----------------------------------------------------------
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# We only want to apply this check if UTF-8 encoding is actually used by the site, otherwise
|
||||||
|
# it will result in false positives.
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# Uncomment this line if your site uses UTF8 encoding
|
||||||
|
#SecAction \
|
||||||
|
"id:'900016', \
|
||||||
|
phase:1, \
|
||||||
|
t:none, \
|
||||||
|
setvar:tx.crs_validate_utf8_encoding=1, \
|
||||||
|
nolog, \
|
||||||
|
pass"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# -- [[ Enable XML Body Parsing ]] -------------------------------------------------------
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# The rules in this file will trigger the XML parser upon an XML request
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# Initiate XML Processor in case of xml content-type
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type "text/xml" \
|
||||||
|
"id:'900017', \
|
||||||
|
phase:1, \
|
||||||
|
t:none,t:lowercase, \
|
||||||
|
nolog, \
|
||||||
|
pass, \
|
||||||
|
chain"
|
||||||
|
SecRule REQBODY_PROCESSOR "!@streq XML" \
|
||||||
|
"ctl:requestBodyProcessor=XML"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# -- [[ Global and IP Collections ]] -----------------------------------------------------
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# Create both Global and IP collections for rules to use
|
||||||
|
# There are some CRS rules that assume that these two collections
|
||||||
|
# have already been initiated.
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent "^(.*)$" \
|
||||||
|
"id:'900018', \
|
||||||
|
phase:1, \
|
||||||
|
t:none,t:sha1,t:hexEncode, \
|
||||||
|
setvar:tx.ua_hash=%{matched_var}, \
|
||||||
|
nolog, \
|
||||||
|
pass"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:x-forwarded-for "^\b(\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3})\b" \
|
||||||
|
"id:'900019', \
|
||||||
|
phase:1, \
|
||||||
|
t:none, \
|
||||||
|
capture, \
|
||||||
|
setvar:tx.real_ip=%{tx.1}, \
|
||||||
|
nolog, \
|
||||||
|
pass"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SecRule &TX:REAL_IP "!@eq 0" \
|
||||||
|
"id:'900020', \
|
||||||
|
phase:1, \
|
||||||
|
t:none, \
|
||||||
|
initcol:global=global, \
|
||||||
|
initcol:ip=%{tx.real_ip}_%{tx.ua_hash}, \
|
||||||
|
nolog, \
|
||||||
|
pass"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SecRule &TX:REAL_IP "@eq 0" \
|
||||||
|
"id:'900021', \
|
||||||
|
phase:1, \
|
||||||
|
t:none, \
|
||||||
|
initcol:global=global, \
|
||||||
|
initcol:ip=%{remote_addr}_%{tx.ua_hash}, \
|
||||||
|
nolog, \
|
||||||
|
pass"
|
3
iis/wix/modsecurity_iis.conf
Normal file
3
iis/wix/modsecurity_iis.conf
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
|
|||||||
|
Include modsecurity.conf
|
||||||
|
Include modsecurity_crs_10_setup.conf
|
||||||
|
Include owasp_crs\activated_rules\*.conf
|
Reference in New Issue
Block a user